Impact of government’s policies on competition of two closed-loop and regular supply chains

Document Type: Research Paper

Authors

1 Industrial Engineering college, Islamic Azad university, South Tehran Branch

2 Knowledge Engineering and Decision Sciences Department, Kharazmi University

Abstract

With progressing technologies and new features of production, new products compete with older ones in markets. Indeed, new products initiate contest with olden ones and this process repeats in different productions lifetime several times. In this situation recycling the olden products seems to be significant for supply chains. Governments often levy special tariffs for these products as a control tool which aims to incentive production recovery. In the real world, government purposes financial incentive plans for recoverable productions and also punitive plans for unrecoverable products. This paper tries to model the competition of a closed-loop supply chain and an ordinary supply chain using a game theory approach. In next step, the effects of persuasive and punitive governmental plans are modeled. Finally optimal retail and wholesale prices of the products are found in two chains. Numerical examples including sensitivity analysis of some key parameters will compare the results between different models of this study.

Keywords

Main Subjects


Bowen, F. E., Cousins, P. D., Lamming, R. C., & Farukt, A. C. (2001). The role of supply management capabilities in green supply. Production and operations management10(2), 174-189.

Chan, F. T., & Kumar, N. (2007). Global supplier development considering risk factors using fuzzy extended AHP-based approach. Omega35(4), 417-431.

Chou, S. Y., & Chang, Y. H. (2008). A decision support system for supplier selection based on a strategy-aligned fuzzy SMART approach. Expert systems with applications34(4), 2241-2253.

Hafezalkotob, A. (2015). Competition of two green and regular supply chains under environmental protection and revenue seeking policies of government. Computers & Industrial Engineering82, 103-114.

Hafezalkotob, A., Alavi, A., & Makui, A. (2015). Government financial intervention in green and regular supply chains: Multi-level game theory approach. International Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management, (ahead-of-printd), 1-11.

Hjaila, K.,Puigjaner, L,. Espuna A.(2015). Scenario-Based Price Negotiations vs. Game Theory in the Optimization of Coordinated Supply Chains. Computer Aided Chemical Engineering, Volume 37, 2015, Pages 1859-1864

Hong, I. H., Lee, Y. T., & Chang, P. Y. (2014). Socially optimal and fund-balanced advanced recycling fees and subsidies in a competitive forward and reverse supply chain. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 82, 75-85.

Jin, C., & Mei, L. (2012). Game Analysis of Multi-Strategy between Government and Suppliers in Green Supply Chain. In Green Communications and Networks (pp. 185-191). Springer Netherlands.

Murphy, J. (2000). Ecological modernisation. Geoforum31(1), 1-8.

Nagurney, A., & Yu, M. (2012). Sustainable fashion supply chain management under oligopolistic competition and brand differentiation. International Journal of Production Economics, 135(2), 532–540.

Qiaolun, G., Jianhua, J., & Tiegang, G. (2008). Pricing management for a closed-loop supply chain. Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management, 7(1), 45-60.

Robeson, J. F. (1994). Logistics Handbook. Simon and Schuster.

Savaskan, R. C., & Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2006). Reverse channel design: the case of competing retailers. Management Science52(1), 1-14.

Sheu, J. B. (2011). Bargaining framework for competitive green supply chains under governmental financial intervention. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review47(5), 573-592.

Sheu, J. B., & Chen, Y. J. (2012). Impact of government financial intervention on competition among green supply chains. International Journal of Production Economics138(1), 201-213.

Shinkuma, T. (2003). On the second-best policy of household's waste recycling. Environmental and Resource Economics24(1), 77-95.

Tian, Yihui, Kannan Govindan, and Qinghua Zhu. A system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory for green supply chain management diffusion among Chinese manufacturers. Journal of Cleaner Production 80 (2014): 96-105.

Tseng, M. L., Chiang, J. H., & Lan, L. W. (2009). Selection of optimal supplier in supply chain management strategy with analytic network process and choquet integral. Computers & Industrial Engineering57(1), 330-340.

Tsireme, A. I., Nikolaou, E. I., Georgantzis, N., & Tsagarakis, K. P. (2012). The influence of environmental policy on the decisions of managers to adopt G-SCM practices. Clean technologies and environmental policy14(5), 953-964.

Vachon, S., & Klassen, R. D. (2008). Environmental management and manufacturing performance: the role of collaboration in the supply chain. International journal of production economics111(2), 299-315.

Wei, J., & Zhao, J. (2011). Pricing decisions with retail competition in a fuzzy closed-loop supply chain. Expert Systems with Applications38(9), 11209-11216.

Wu, C. H. (2012). Price and service competition between new and remanufactured products in a two-echelon supply chain. International Journal of Production Economics140(1), 496-507.

Zamarripa, Miguel A., et al. Mathematical programming and game theory optimization-based tool for supply chain planning in cooperative/competitive environments. Chemical Engineering Research and Design 91.8 (2013): 1588-1600.

Zhang, C. T., & Liu, L. P. (2013). Research on coordination mechanism in three-level green supply chain under non-cooperative game. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 37(5), 3369–3379.

Zhou, M., & Zhang, S. W. (2007). Three players game analysis between government, coal and electricity power. Coal Economic Research, (4), 33-34.

Zhu, Q., Sarkis, J., Cordeiro, J. J., & Lai, K. H. (2008). Firm-level correlates of emergent green supply chain management practices in the Chinese context. Omega36(4), 577-591.