Iranian Institute of Industrial EngineeringJournal of Industrial and Systems Engineering1735-827211Special issue on game theory applications' in industrial engineering20170101A Game Theoretical Study on Pricing and Production Decisions of Firms12450666ENAidaHami DindarIndustrial Engineering, Islamic Azad University, South Tehran BranchAta AllahTaleizadehUniversity of TehranJournal Article20170412Today, products’ lead time adjustment has become one of the main challenges for organizations managers and service companies. Products’ lead time has an undeniable impact on firms’ inventory control way in order to meet required customer demand. In addition, pricing on manufactured good way, in order to achieve most profit and decrease the side expenditures, is of issues of importance in this context. In this research, market demand, is considered Sensitive to product sales price and amount of inventory-on-hand and We have addressed to analyze the behavior of firms by assuming Being unauthorized of Shortage. It should be noted that in both scenarios, firms’ decision making review about appropriate lead time optimal policies, products’ price and amount of inventory as the problem decision variables with the aim of maximizing profits and minimizing costs are addressed. In first scenario, only a single firm behavior analysis is considered and in second scenario, two firm’s behavior Study when changing in price level, lead time and inventory at exclusive market have been addressed by using Nash equilibrium. In the following, by expressing numerical examples, we have addressed to the problem results analysis and have determined optimal points. Sensitivity analysis clearly Shows Market potential and inventory attraction parameters influence on the decision variables. Eventually, it was found that among two proposed scenarios, single firm’s scenario is more profitable than the two firms’ scenario. This research can be helpful for planners and industrial managers to optimize existing conditions, achieving maximum profit.https://www.jise.ir/article_50666_10c0bde498151133ecbbf99bd285aced.pdfIranian Institute of Industrial EngineeringJournal of Industrial and Systems Engineering1735-827211Special issue on game theory applications' in industrial engineering20170101Competitive pricing in reliable supply chain with uncertainty254650667ENMostafaSetakk.n.toosi universityFaribaFeizizadehDepartment of Industrial Engineering, K.N. Toosi University of Technology, Tehran, IranHamidTikaniDepartment of Industrial Engineering, K.N. Toosi University of Technology, Tehran, IranJournal Article20170720Natural catastrophes or man-made mistakes cause a great economic loss in various industries. Because of that, managing supply chains in a reliable manner has become a significant concern for decision makers. More precisely, any devastation insupply chain’s elements reduce the overall revenue. In this study, we strive to maximize the total profit of distribution centers (DCs) with a set of retailers by considering risk of disruptions for facilities. Moreover, a game-theoretic approach is employed to simultaneously investigate the impacts of facility location, inventory management, breakdown of facilities and pricing strategies in a three-echelon supply chain. Various numerical experiments are generated to assess the accuracy of achieved solutions. In the following, a sensitivity analysis is performed for some specific parameters to recognize the most important factors affecting the system's performance. The results show that considering disruptions helps to provide a more accurate estimation for the system. Finally, the value of the stochastic solution (VSS) is used to justify that putting extra efforts into formulating and solving stochastic programming is worthwhile.https://www.jise.ir/article_50667_c5dad0890e623f112501bd5931a20f69.pdfIranian Institute of Industrial EngineeringJournal of Industrial and Systems Engineering1735-827211Special issue on game theory applications' in industrial engineering20170101Linear Quadratic Differential Game Formulation for Leaderless Formation Control475850882ENHosseinBarghi JondYoung Researchers and Elite Club, Ahar Branch, Islamic Azad University, Ahar, IranVasifV. NabiyevDepartment of Computer Engineering, Karadeniz Technical University, Trabzon, TurkeyDaliborLukášDepartment of Applied Mathematics, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Informatics, VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Ostrava, Czech RepublicJournal Article20170803The leaderless formation control problem for a multi-robot system with double integrator dynamics is studied. The interaction dynamics among robots and the formation objective are added together and expressed in terms of individual cost functions. The problem is posed as a linear quadratic differential game. For the non cooperative mode of play, the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution of the formation control differential game problem is discussed. It is shown that the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium solution for the formation problem, whose cost functions are Mayer type, depends on the invertibility of a matrix introduced. A triangle formation is tested to justify the models and the results.https://www.jise.ir/article_50882_d2abdc034c8035de05f41e88d422be1d.pdfIranian Institute of Industrial EngineeringJournal of Industrial and Systems Engineering1735-827211Special issue on game theory applications' in industrial engineering20181004Leader-follower competitive facility Location and Design problem in an uncertain environment597154010ENParvinSoleymaniSchool of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Narmak, Tehran, Iran.Seyed JafarSadjadiSchool of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology,Tehran, IranMiladGorjiSchool of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Narmak, Tehran, IranFatemehTaremiSchool of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Narmak, Tehran, IranJournal Article20171105This paper aims at providing a new approach to optimize location and design (quality) decision for new facilities as a leader-follower competitive configuration under the condition that competitor’s reaction is unknown. A chain is considered as a leader in the first level and tends to open a new facility in a specific market where similar competitor facilities as follower already exist. In the second level, the follower decides on locating and designing some facilities through the market subject to the location and design of leader’s facilities to keep or capture more market share. The market share captured by each facility depends on its distance to customers and its quality based on probabilistic Huff-like model. In facts, the leader decides on location and quality of its own new facility based on the follower reaction strategies to maximize its profit<strong>. </strong>Since the number of the follower’s new facilities are unknown for the leader, "robust optimization" is used for modeling this problem. A case from two chain stores in the city of Tehran, Iran, is studied and the proposed model is implemented. The computational results display the robustness and effectiveness of the model and highlight the importance of using robust optimization approach in uncertain competitive environments. https://www.jise.ir/article_54010_ae1ea61fe9c315fbd913c38d6ddc7c0d.pdfIranian Institute of Industrial EngineeringJournal of Industrial and Systems Engineering1735-827211Special issue on game theory applications' in industrial engineering20181024Pricing and warranty for hi-tech products considering failures due to unknown faults and human errors (A game theory approach)728260779ENAzamAhmadianDepartment of Industrial Engineering, Alzahra University, Tehran, IranMaryamEsmaeiliDepartment of Industrial Engineering, Alzahra University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20180120Hi-tech warranty reports show that a considerable percent of product's failures are related to the unknown faults and human errors, respectively. In this paper, two joint price and warranty models in a supply chain are presented for Hi-tech products. The supply chain includes a retailer and a customer, regarding failures due to unknown faults and human errors, beside the production failures. In the first model, failures due to production defects and human errors are considered separable, and in the second model they are considered inseparable. For both models, the interaction between the retailer and the customer is considered by retailer-Stackelberg game. The optimal purchase time, price, and warranty length are determined by maximizing the profits of customer and the retailer. Finally, the numerical example and sensitivity analysis are presented to illustrate the working logic of the models<strong>.</strong>https://www.jise.ir/article_60779_b7b115573495fea6ce370f70e56963c1.pdfIranian Institute of Industrial EngineeringJournal of Industrial and Systems Engineering1735-827211Special issue on game theory applications' in industrial engineering20181024Optimal control of quality investment in joint venture by Stackelberg game8310763377ENMojtabaArab MomeniSchool of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and TechnologySaeedYaghoubiSchool of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology0000-0003-1218-9050Mohammad RezaAlihaSchool of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and TechnologyJournal Article20180106In projects carried out as joint venture (<em>JV</em>), two or more legally independent firms form a strategic alliance to do a project cooperatively and to obtain the necessary credits asked by a contractor. Due to the wide scope of a joint venture project, partners are sometimes from different areas industrial fields or even different countries which might have different quality standards. Such differences in the quality standard result in the problem of quality difficulties which entails sufficient planning to avoid or decrease it. In this paper, a cost sharing coordination mechanism based on a two person Stackelberg game is proposed in which, the more qualified partner that acts as the leader invests in the quality promotion of the other partner who acts as the follower and the costs of investment are shared between the partners according to a contract. Based on the dynamic nature of the quality level and the investment programs, the problem is modeled as an optimal control problem for which the necessary and sufficient conditionsof the optimal solution arediscussed. Also, based on the Hamilton function of the optimal control problem, some alternatives for the path of investment are considered. Then the path which results in the best gain for the partners according to the leader-follower game is chosen as the solution of the problem.The results show that the optimal path of investment is parameter dependent so the sensitivity analysis is done to show how changes in the parameters affect the best path of investment.https://www.jise.ir/article_63377_02db8e8e8d3c08f3a57cc6db3876f942.pdfIranian Institute of Industrial EngineeringJournal of Industrial and Systems Engineering1735-827211Special issue on game theory applications' in industrial engineering20181026Coordination of a green supply chain with one manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers through an environmental and social cost sharing contract10812663378ENSamiraEbrahimiSchool of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, IranSeyyed-MahdiHosseini-MotlaghSchool of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, IranJournal Article20180114In this paper, an incentive contract is proposed to coordinate the environmental and social decisions in a manufacturer-duopolistic retailers green supply chain.The manufacturer invests in newtechnology to enhance the green level of the products and two retailers invest in the corporate social responsibility (CSR). The investigated supply chain is modeled under three decision-making structures. In the decentralized model, a manufacturer-Stackelberg game under the two different game behaviors of retailers (Cournot and Collusion) is investigated. Afterward, the centralized model as a benchmark is established. Then, an environmental and social cost sharing contract is developed to encourage the supply chain members to participate in the coordination model. Under the coordination model, the surplus profit is shared among the members based on the members’ bargaining power. Results demonstrate that the proposed coordination contract not only improves the profitability of entire supply chain and members,but also enhances the green quality and CSR investment compared with the decentralized model. Therefore, theproposed coordination model is of high importance from environmental consideration.https://www.jise.ir/article_63378_e774866277b69ee92ca3e44bc92db9cc.pdfIranian Institute of Industrial EngineeringJournal of Industrial and Systems Engineering1735-827211Special issue on game theory applications' in industrial engineering20171129Inventory Control Games with Prepayments12714375682ENAta AllahTaleizadehSchool of Industrial Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranKouroshHalatDepartment of Industrial Engineering, South Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20180413The cost game arises when a group of retailers who observe demand for a common good decide to cooperate and make join orders following the EOQ policy. In this paper we present a new class of inventory games that is strategically equivalent to that class of inventory cost games: inventory games with advance payments. This model extends the traditional inventory model to the situation where advance payments of retailers are required. We propose a core distribution, which is based on a proportional allocation, as well as a population monotonic allocation scheme, for inventory games with advance payments. Then, we examine the stability of grand coalition from both a myopic and farsighted perspective, and conclude that it is always stable from both points of view. To complete our study, we develop a sensitivity analysis for the model and evaluate the changes produced on the proposed core distribution.https://www.jise.ir/article_75682_415bf9f01c16734c980004c42a3d5cd4.pdfIranian Institute of Industrial EngineeringJournal of Industrial and Systems Engineering1735-827211Special issue on game theory applications' in industrial engineering20181205Presenting a multi-objective locating-routing-arc model with a collaborative approach (a food distribution case study)14416375681ENAkbarJavanmardiDepartment of Industrial Engineering, Islamic Azad University, South Tehran Branch, Tehran, IranAshkanHafezalkotobDepartment of Industrial Engineering, Islamic Azad University, South Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran0000-0002-6637-5716Journal Article20171226Transportation in the industrialized world plays an important role in the economic development of countries by enabling the consumption of products at very remote locations. Transportation costs are one of the most important parts of the finished products’ costs. In general, locating-routing-arc is highly important for industries that are heavily involved with the end customers such as the consumer product industries. In these industries, due to the insignificant difference between the products of the various companies, the maintenance of the market and the loyalty of customers depend on the timely availability of the required products. Hence, providing the customers ‘need at the right time and place with high level of responding is highly important to get customers’ satisfaction. In this study, the problem of locating-routing-arc is studied by using game theory. In the investigated problem, there are a number of demand points as customers, each of which has a specific demand (delivered, handover or return) of every type of products and each customer determines the delivery time for each product. To solve the Problem in Small dimensions, a mathematical model is presented in the form of the mixed integer, two-objective, multi-cyclic, and multi-commodity and for to solve the problem in big dimensions in the form of NP-HARD. The model is to test the validation of the proposed model, a ε-constraint method is used and Pareto solutions are calculated. Then due to the complexity of the problem in big dimensions. We used the meta-heuristics NSGA-II algorithm in cooperative and non-cooperative modes. Finally, the results if cooperative methods were used to allocate the amount of savings.https://www.jise.ir/article_75681_3b128f1c635dda6d40b32de6f470b242.pdf